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Securities Arbitration in China: A
Better Alternative to Retail
Shareholder Protection
By Gu Weixia*
Abstract: There is a large body of law and finance literature suggesting that
strong legal protection for investors is the key to a nation’s healthy stock market
development and economic growth. Despite remarkable progress in setting up
its securities market, China has often been criticized for its underdeveloped
regulatory regime. The wide securities fraud scandals that contrast with the
paucity of conviction rates are indicative of China’s inadequate public securities
law enforcement. Private enforcement efforts, such as securities litigation, help
address the disconnect between the securities regulatory regime and investor
compensation. Nevertheless, given the immaturity of China’s current legal and
institutional framework, various factors preclude private securities litigation
from playing an effective role in China’s market regulation and development.
Against the background, this Article seeks to explore alternative mechanisms for
improving private enforcement in China. After concluding that modeling the
U.S. class action system is quite unlikely to work well in China’s sociopolitical
and socioeconomic context, this Article explores how the present system of
securities fraud litigation should be reformed in order to balance the competing
interests of state control, social stability, and minority shareholder protection in
the listed companies. In view of the dominance of retail shareholders in the
Chinese securities market, and drawing on international experience, this Article
proposes a cost-effective and accessible securities arbitration scheme in China
for resolving civil compensation claims. This Article argues that the
professionalism, procedural flexibility, speed, confidentiality, and cost saving
features of arbitration offer much potential as a deterrent and remedial device in
addressing the deficiencies of private enforcement of securities regulation
during China’s economic transition.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Developing a fair, efficient, and orderly securities market is one of
China’s biggest institutional challenges today. Since initial economic
reforms from a planned to a market economy, a high private savings rate
and the public’s appetite to hold risky securities have contributed to
impressive growth of the market. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges were established in 1990, and since then, the number of listed
companies has grown exponentially. At the end of 2011, a total of 2,342
companies were listed on the two stock exchanges, 1 compared to fifty-three
1
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listed companies in 1992.2 China’s securities market, while only twenty
years old, boasted a market capitalization of RMB 21.5 trillion by the end
of 2011.3
Despite remarkable progress in setting up its securities market, China
has often been criticized for its underdeveloped regulatory regime. Unlike
its overseas counterparts, which established security markets to provide
finance to enterprises, China established its securities market to assist in the
reform of its financially distressed state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 4 Given
the political logic of China’s securities market, its securities watchdog, the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), is handicapped in
carrying out its regulatory and supervisory mandate. The paucity of
securities fraud scandals and the modest conviction rates are indicative of
the fact that the CSRC has inadequately enforced the law. 5 Meanwhile,
private enforcement of China’s Securities Law, such as securities litigation,
has played only a limited role in assisting the prevention of market abuse
and the regulation of the securities market.
Against the background, this Article seeks to explore various
mechanisms to promote the enforcement of the Securities Law in China.
Due to the conflicting roles of the CSRC, both as a market promoter and a
primary market regulator for listed companies, the CSRC’s ability to
discipline powerful wrongdoers of fraud is most likely handicapped. It
would therefore appear that a further strengthening of public enforcement
efforts is unlikely to be a panacea to the weak enforcement of the Securities
Law in China. On the other hand, a large body of law and finance literature
suggests that strong legal protection for investors is the key to a nation’s
healthy stock market development and economic growth. 6 Private
enforcement efforts compensate victims of securities fraud and help address
the disconnect between the securities regulatory regime and investor
compensation. Nevertheless, given the immaturity of China’s current legal
and institutional framework, various factors preclude private securities
COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at
119
(2012),
available
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/201205/P020120515677609374835.pdf.
2
CSRC, CHINA’S SECURITIES AND FUTURES MARKETS 9 (2004), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529630009496.doc.
3
CSRC, supra note 1, at 16.
4
YU G UANGHUA, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA: POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE 23–41 (2007).
5
Gongmeng Chen et al., Is China’s Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger?
Evidence from Enforcement Actions, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 451, 457 (2005) (stating that
the stock markets’ “legal and institutional framework . . . is still relatively primitive by
Western standards”).
6
See, e.g., Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection
and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. & ECON. 3 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).
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litigation from playing a significant role in China’s market regulation and
development. 7 Therefore, this Article seeks to explore alternative
mechanisms for improvement.
Following this introduction, Part II evaluates the current level of legal
protection afforded to minority public shareholders of listed companies in
China. This Part will also lay down the background information on two
alternatives, namely, the introduction of a class action system and a
securities arbitration scheme for facilitating private enforcement of the
Securities Law. To ameliorate the collective action problem faced by
minority shareholders in filing a securities suit, Part III discusses whether
directly transplanting the class action system of the United States can
supply an optimal amount of private enforcement in China. The United
States model was chosen because class actions originated there, and some
other countries have either adopted or actively considered embracing the
American class action procedures in their recent legal reforms. After
answering this in the negative, Part IV next explores the feasibility of
utilizing alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures to resolve civil
compensation claims. This Article concludes that the procedural flexibility,
speed, and cost savings of ADR procedures offer much potential as a
deterrent and remedial device in policing the corporate misconduct of listed
companies in China.
II.

THE PARADIGM OF RETAIL SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN
CHINA
Although China is committed to establishing a modern enterprise
system to cater to the needs of a market economy, the political logic of
China’s securities market has contributed not only to the fragmentation of
shares,8 but also to poor corporate governance in listed companies. One of
the core governance issues of listed SOEs is their highly concentrated
ownership structure. In order to bring its SOEs within the market’s orbit
without privatizing their ownership structure, the government owned twothirds of the equity in listed companies as non-tradable shares, 9 either
directly as state-owned shares (guoyou gu) or indirectly as legal person
shares (faren gu), until the launch of a share structure reform program in

7
See Marlon A. Layton, Is Private Securities Litigation Essential for the Development of
China’s Stock Markets?, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1948, 1973–76 (2008).
8
To prevent investors from gaining control of SOEs through share ownership, the
government created various classes of shares—state, legal-person, individual, and foreign—
and predicated ownership on the shareholder’s identity. See Sandra P. Kister, China’s
Share-Structure Reform: An Opportunity to Move Beyond Practical Solutions to Practical
Problems, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 312, 317–18 (2007).
9
CSRC, supra note 2, at 27–28.
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2005.10 As dispersed individual shareholders have no meaningful influence
over the decision-making processes in SOEs, potential conflicts of interest
between majority and minority shareholders remain a core corporate
governance problem.11
Moreover, the dominance of retail shareholders in the Chinese
securities market suggests that the risk of actual fraud is heightened.
Individual shareholders are given limited access to corporate information
and lack professional knowledge on how to evaluate corporate performance,
creating ample opportunities for connected transactions 12 and
misappropriations of corporate assets, particularly with respect to SOEs.
Not only is the domestic securities market tainted with widespread insider
trading, price manipulation, and other fraudulent activities, the impact of
poor corporate governance has also been felt abroad in recent years as
Chinese companies increasingly seek overseas listings. For instance, a
recent report by NERA Economic Consulting stated that eighteen percent of
all securities class actions in the United States were filed against Chinesedomiciled companies or companies with principal executive officers in
China, and all of these suits dealt with accounting allegations.13
A. Flawed Securities Framework
Poor corporate governance is also attributable to the poorly drafted
corporate and securities laws in China. Given that the development of
China’s securities markets is driven by the goal of assisting SOE reform,
securities laws and regulations have failed to provide adequate protection
for the rights and interests of public investors in China. While protecting
minority shareholders from opportunistic expropriation by management or
controlling shareholders has always been a critical principle of corporate
governance, it was not the chief concern of the Chinese lawmakers in the
early 1990s. The first corporate code in China, the Company Law of 1993,
was aimed at providing legal support for the establishment of a modern
enterprise system and setting down the political agenda of transforming
10

Shangshi Gongsi Guquan Fenzhi Gaige Guanli Banfa (上市公司股权分置改革管理
办法) [Measures on Administration of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies]
(promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, Sept. 4, 2005, effective Sept. 4, 2005)
(China).
11
Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA ECON.
REV. 494, 495 (2003).
12
The “connected transactions” (guanlian jiaoyi) are paraphrased as “related-party
transactions.” See JING LENG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA’S
TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY 152–53 (2009) (describing the high risk of related-party
transactions in SOEs).
13
JORDAN MILEV ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2011 MID-YEAR REVIEW 8–12 (2011), available at
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Trends_Year-End_1211_final.pdf.
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SOEs into joint-stock companies. Although the Company Law spells out
basic governance structures for all shareholding companies, the Chinese
style shareholding system has difficulty reconciling the dual goals of
maximizing shareholder value and maintaining state ownership.
In an effort to maintain a fair and orderly securities market and to
protect the interests of investors, China enacted the Securities Law in 1998,
which among other things expressly prohibits various forms of market
misconduct, such as insider trading, market manipulation, and inaccurate
disclosure.14 Substantial revisions to the Securities Law in 2005 improved
the system governing the issuance, trading, registration, and settlement of
securities.15 The 2005 revision also set down more stringent requirements
regarding information disclosure and increased the legal responsibilities on
integrity obligations of the shareholders and other officers who are in
control of the listed companies. Following the revision, related agencies
made corresponding adjustments to other relevant laws and regulation
documents to ensure they better reflected market rules.
Although legal provisions have been improved to address chronic
illness within corporate governance, the law overemphasizes the role of the
government in the securities arena.
Public enforcement, through
administrative and criminal sanctions, holds a more prominent position than
private enforcement in China, despite its inadequacies. For instance,
Chapter XI of the Legal Liability Chapter of the Securities Law of 1998 is
comprised of thirty-six articles, thirty-two of which carry substantive
penalties in the form of criminal and administrative liability. The role of
civil remedies has been overlooked, evidenced by the fact that there are
only two articles on civil liability. In the absence of detailed operational
provisions on how private securities suits can be brought, local courts have
refused to hear most of the securities fraud cases filed by investors in search
of civil compensation. 16 This is the case despite the fact that the courts
14
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 证 券 法 )
[Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 7, 1999) (China) [hereinafter 1998
Securities Law].
15
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuxi Ling (Di Sishisan Hao) (中华人民共和国
主席令 (第四十三号)) [Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (revised in 2005)]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1,
2006) (China) [hereinafter 2005 Securities Law].
16
For instance, a Chinese court dismissed an action against Chengdu Hongguang Co.
Ltd in 1998 for non-compliance with accounting and disclosure requirements on the grounds
that there was no specific procedure for such action in China at that time. Bin Hu & Chenxia
Shi, Directors’ Liability for False Statements in the Information Disclosure of Listed
Companies in China, 1 J. AUSTRALASIAN L. TEACHERS ASS’N 67, 69 (2008),
http://www.alta.edu.au/resources/PDFs/JALTA/2008/(2008)%20Directors’%20Liability_B
%20Hu%20&%20C%20Shi.pdf. The action against Shandong Bohai Corporation in 1998
for false accounting initially brought by aggrieved investors was similarly rejected. Walter
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could have adopted an expansive interpretation of older pieces of legislation,
such as the General Principles of Civil Law, to grant relief. 17
B. Inadequate Public Enforcement by the CSRC
Rampant securities fraud in China does not lie solely in the
imperfection of the laws. Overlapping functions of the securities regulatory
bodies and resource constraints have both contributed to the weak
enforcement of the Securities Law. Until the early 1990s, China did not
have a specialized central agency to regulate the securities market. The two
stock exchanges were supervised by local governments, with little oversight
by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). In the aftermath of stock-related
protests in Shenzhen in 1991, the government decided to strengthen
securities regulatory oversight by establishing the State Council Securities
Commission (SCSC) and the CSRC in 1992. The SCSC was a ministeriallevel government agency in charge of macro-management of the securities
market and was the primary authority for market regulation.18 The CSRC
was then designed as the SCSC’s executive branch to supervise the market
and securities firms.19 Yet, the CSRC was merely a non-profit institution
(shiye danwei) that lacked any substantial supervisory powers and tools to
make rules or punish misconduct. 20 As such, the securities market remained
inadequately supervised. It was not until 1998 that the multi-tier regulatory
structure was removed and the CSRC became the principal regulator of the
securities and futures market. The CSRC’s current mandate is to ensure the
orderly and lawful operation of the securities market. 21
While a nationwide capital market has gradually developed and the
Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China’s Legal
System?,
24
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 599,
604 n.17
(2003),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume24/issue3/Hutchens24U.Pa.J.Int%27l
Econ.L.599%282003%29.pdf.
17
For example, the General Principles of Civil Law provides that tort victims are
entitled to civil compensation. Additionally, the Governance Standards for Listed
Companies, promulgated by the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission in
January 2002, provides that investors can seek compensation through civil litigation when
their rights are harmed. More specifically, China’s Securities Law provides that issuers,
underwriters and their responsible directors, and other corporate officers can be liable for
losses suffered by investors because of misrepresentations or material omissions in
disclosure documents. 1998 Securities Law, supra note 14, art. 63.
18
Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Zhengquan Shichang Hongguan Guanli de
Tongzhi (国务院关于进一步加强证券市场宏观管理的通知) [Notice of the State Council
Concerning Further Strengthening Macro-Administration of the Securities Market]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 17, 1992), item 1(1) (China).
19
See id. at item 1(2).
20
WANG LIANZHOU & LI CHENG, FENGFENG YUYU ZHENGQUANFA (风风雨雨证券法)
[THE VICISSITUDES OF THE SECURITIES LAW] 49 (2000) (China).
21
1998 Securities Law, supra note 14, art. 166.

289

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:283 (2013)

number of listed companies has grown exponentially since the early 1990s,
the CSRC was not well equipped to carry out its mandate in its early years
of operation. There was no enforcement bureau or other enforcement
offices when it was established in 1993. Three years later, the predecessor
of the CSRC Enforcement Bureau, the Complaints Division of the CSRC
Legal Affairs Department, was staffed with only four members. During
that period, Anthony Neoh, the former Chair of the Securities and Futures
Commission in Hong Kong, remarked that both the Chinese market and its
regulators were very unsophisticated. 22 Neoh’s remark was echoed by a
Chinese top economist Wu Jinglian, who unfavorably compared the
corruption-ridden market to a “casino.”23
After a decade of operation, the CSRC is much better equipped to
carry out its mandate. Unfortunately, its enforcement efforts remain
inadequate. To date, it has established thirty-six securities regulatory
bureaus in the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. Yet, as
with other securities regulators worldwide, the CSRC is confronted with
considerable resource constraints in fulfilling its duties. In 2006, there were
still only 289 staff members in the Enforcement Bureau, 24 compared to a
total of 1,434 companies listed on the two national exchanges. 25 Most
enforcement staff lacked experience and knowledge in the securities field,
which presented a major disadvantage for them in dealing with the
complexities of securities crimes. 26 Even after the establishment of a
special Enforcement Team (jicha zongdui) in the CSRC in 2007 to facilitate
the investigation of significant securities fraud cases, and a significant
increase of total enforcement staff to approximately 600, it appeared that
public enforcement efforts remained inadequate. 27 Contrary to the severity
of insider trading and inaccurate disclosure in China’s stock market in
2007,28 the table below29 shows that the number of sanctions imposed by
22

A Good Beginning, CHINA ECON. REV. (Mar. 1, 1999, 2:00 PM),
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/node/23419.
23
JING LENG, supra note 12, at 118 & n.4 (citing Wu Jinglian’s interview on Dui hua (对
话 ) [Dialogue]: Zhongguo Gushi Buru Duchang ( 中国股市不如赌场 ) [China’s Stock
Market Is Worse Than Casinos] (China Central Television broadcast Jan. 13, 2001)).
24
Hongming Cheng, Insider Trading in China: The Case for the Chinese Securities
Regulatory Commission 15 J. FIN. CRIME 165, 168 (2008).
25
CSRC, CHINA’S SECURITIES AND FUTURES MARKETS 3 (2007), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529643752895.pdf.
26
Hongming Cheng, supra note 24 (noting that most CSRC enforcement staff members
lack knowledge and experience in the securities field).
27
Zhengjianhui Jicha Zongdui Chengli (证监会稽查总队成立) [The Establishment of
Special Enforcement Team in the CSRC], XINHUA NEWS NET (Nov. 18, 2007),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-11/18/content_7097686.htm.
28
See id. at 165 (finding the paucity of insider trading cases and the lack of convictions
for insider trading offenses in China).
29
The figures are extracted from CSRC Annual Reports, each of which includes the total
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the CSRC from 2007 to 2011 seems rather modest.
Year
Listed Companies
Cases Closed
Cases informally investigated
Sanction Decisions
Companies Sanctioned
Individuals Sanctioned

2007
1,530
405
N/A
54
26
155

2008
1,604
130
157
77
N/A
N/A

2009
1,700
106
121
N/A
23
218

2011
2,342
N/A
N/A
68
13
198

Aside from a shortage of trained personnel and resources, the CSRC
further faces a serious conflict of interest in its dual role as primary market
regulator and market promoter of the listed corporations. As most listed
companies in China are SOEs, 30 regulatory efforts of the CSRC are
muddied by political considerations. Fearful of a market collapse and
subsequent economic and political repercussions, the CSRC is subject to
enormous pressure not to vigorously pursue SOEs for securities fraud.
C. Inadequate Private Enforcement
Ideally, an institutionalized private securities litigation system can
complement public enforcement activities of the securities regulators. As
the primary role of securities regulators is to ensure a fair, orderly, and
robust securities market, they are not in a position to adjudicate any
financial remedy for defrauded shareholders who suffer economic losses
arising from securities fraud. A well-functioning private securities
litigation system can provide additional deterrence against securities fraud,
and simultaneously serve as a remedial device for aggrieved investors
through the imposition of damages against the perpetrators of fraud.
number of listed companies on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges at the end of
each respective year. See CSRC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION ANNUAL
REPORT
2007,
at
68,
76
(2008),
available
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529644379854.pdf;
CSRC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 35, 84
(2009),
available
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200907/P020090701496625000834.pdf;
CSRC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 50–51, 111–
12
(2010),
available
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/201011/P020101105493830315968.pdf;
CRSC, supra note 1, at 37, 109–10 (reporting 2011 figures). The CRSC’s 2010 annual
report did not contain the relevant figures. See CRSC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY
COMMISSION
ANNUAL
REPORT
2010
(2011),
available
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/201203/P020120315575855936801.pdf;
30
See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM
266 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that “typically only SOEs are approved for listing on the . . . stock
exchanges,” resulting in very few listed private companies); Layton, supra note 7, at 1949.
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Nevertheless, various systemic and institutional obstacles, such as
procedural difficulties, an absence of financial incentives in bringing
securities suits, substantial filing fees, underdeveloped group litigation rules,
and a lack of judicial infrastructure, preclude private enforcement from
playing a significant role in securities market regulation in China. These
obstacles lead to disincentives for public investors to detect and prosecute
frauds and assist in the anti-securities fraud campaigns of the government,
as well as contribute to widespread market misconduct.
1. The SPC Circulars between 2001 and 2003
Following the outbreak of market scandals in the 2000s, the
inadequacy of the private securities litigation system has become an
increasingly serious problem in China. As aggrieved investors continued to
file suits at first instance courts, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued
three circulars between September 2001 and January 2003 (collectively
“SPC Circulars”) to clarify the situation.
In the first circular, issued on September 21, 2001 (2001 Circular), the
SPC imposed a temporary ban on the acceptance by lower courts of civil
compensation suits. 31 Justice Li Guoguang, Vice President of the SPC at
the time and drafter of the 2001 Circular, justified the SPC’s refusal to
allow securities litigation on the ground that the local courts lacked
resources and experience to hear these cases.32 However, the 2001 Circular
attracted severe criticism from academics, practitioners, and investors. 33
Subsequently, this ban was partially lifted after just four months. 34
In the second circular, issued on January 15, 2002 (2002 Circular), the
SPC instructed lower courts to accept investor suits for misrepresentation
on the condition that the company and the relevant persons had been
administratively sanctioned or criminally convicted for the same
misrepresentation.35 Additionally, the 2002 Circular requires a lawsuit to
31
Zuigao Remin Fayuan Guanyu She Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Anjian Zan Buyu
Shouli de Tongzhi (最高人民法院关于涉证券民事赔偿案件暂不予受理的通知) [Circular
Regarding Non-Acceptance of Securities-Related Civil Compensation Cases] (promulgated
by the Sup. People’s Ct., Sept. 21, 2001, effective Sept. 21, 2001) (China).
32
LI GUOGUANG & JIAWEI, ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG XUJIA CHENGSHU MINSHI PEICHANG
ZHIDU ( 证 券 市 场 虛 假 陈 述 民 事 赔 偿 制 度 ) [THE CIVIL COMPENSATION SYSTEM OF
SECURITIES MARKET MISREPRESENTATION] 2–3 (2003) (China).
33
Id. at 113–14.
34
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa
de Minshi Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (最高人民法院关于受理证
券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事侵权纠纷案件有关问题的通知) [Notice of the Supreme
People’s Court on Relevant Issues of Filing of Civil Tort Disputes Arising From
Misrepresentation on the Securities Market] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 15,
2002, effective Jan. 15, 2002) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter 2002 Circular].
35
Id.
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be filed within two years from the date of the decision. 36 On December 26,
2002, the SPC promulgated the “Several Provisions on Trial of Civil
Damages Cases Arising from Misrepresentation in the Securities Market”
(2003 Circular), which became effective on February 1, 2003.37 The 2003
Circular expanded on the 2002 Circular and provided that both firms and
individuals can be named as defendants in a securities suit. 38 Individual
defendants can include executives, directors, supervisory board members,
and controlling shareholders at a listed company, as well as other
responsible individuals at professional service firms.39 The 2003 Circular
also laid down procedural and evidentiary requirements for bringing
securities-related misrepresentation suits.
2. Technical Constraints of Group Litigation Rules in China
By providing a functional basis for investors to bring a private
securities suit, the SPC Circulars raise high expectations in upgrading
China’s securities regulatory framework and mark a significant step
forward in investor protection. Despite these expectations, however, the
SPC Circulars have failed to adequately promote the private enforcement of
China’s securities laws.
One major criticism is that the SPC Circulars unduly restrict the scope
of cases for which civil compensation may be sought. 40 Relief can only be
sought for cases arising from misrepresentation (xujia chenshu), which is
defined to include false statements (xujia jizai), misleading statements
(wudaoxing chenshu), material omissions (zhongda yilou), or improper
disclosures (buzhengdang pilu). 41 The Circulars provide no basis for
private litigation based on other forms of securities fraud regulated by the
CSRC that have been prevalent on the market, such as insider dealing
(neimu jiaoyi) and market manipulation (caozong shichang).
This
effectively deprives defrauded investors of compensation even if the CSRC
determines liability and imposes administrative penalties against the
36

Id.
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu
Yinfa de Minshi Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理证券市场因
虚 假 陈 述 引 发 的 民 事 赔 偿 案 件 的 若 干 规 定 ) [Several Provisions on Trial of Civil
Compensation Cases Arising from Misrepresentation on the Securities Market] (promulgated
by the Sup. People’s Ct.., Dec. 26, 2002, effective Feb. 1, 2003) (Lawinfochina) (China)
[hereinafter 2003 Circular].
38
Id. art. 2.
39
Id. art. 7.
40
See, e.g., Hutchens, supra note 16, at 630–32; Yin Jie (殷洁), Zhengquan Xujia
Chenshu Minshi Zeren Zhidu Lun (证券虚假陈述民事责任制度论) [On The System of
Civil Liability of Misrepresentation in Securities Fraud], 6 FAXUE (法学) [LEGAL SCI.] 109,
110–11 (2003) (China).
41
2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 17.
37
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wrongdoers.
The second line of criticism is that victims of securities fraud may be
denied recovery due to restrictive rules on proving causation between the
misrepresentation and the resulting financial loss. For shareholders to
establish legal entitlement to compensation, Article 6 of the 2003 Circular
provides that shareholder-plaintiffs must prove the existence of a causal
link (yinguo guanxi) between the defendant’s wrongdoing and the
plaintiff’s loss. 42 However, causation would not be established if the
affected security was purchased before the misrepresentation was made, or
if the security was sold before the relevant misrepresentation was made
public. 43 Regardless of any loss that might actually have been incurred,
defrauded shareholders are effectively excluded from compensation when a
listed company fails to disclose material price-sensitive information in a
timely manner,44 a situation that is not uncommon. In such an example,
these shareholders may have sold their shares, thinking that the company’s
current performance indicated dim prospects. In fact, the company may
have withheld material information, causing the share price to rise when the
disclosure was made at a later time. Although these shareholders sold the
shares at a price lower than what they could have obtained had they waited
to sell until after the disclosure of the price-sensitive information, they are
left with no course of action against the wrongdoers under the SPC
Circulars, not even after the wrongdoers have been sanctioned by the courts
or the relevant administrative authorities. The imposition of fines or
confiscation of proceeds by the administrative authorities could not have
assisted the shareholders either, because the fines imposed or the proceeds
confiscated go to the State Treasury.45
Another line of attack relates to the absence of financial incentives in
bringing private securities suits in China. The matter of costs does not
merely affect the efficacy of the private securities fraud suits, but also
determines whether this procedure will be utilized at all. From an economic
point of view, plaintiffs will sue only when the expected award exceeds the
litigation costs. However, litigation costs are major obstacles for aggrieved
investors to lodge a private suit to recover losses resulting from securities
fraud. While contingency fee arrangements are generally prohibited in
China, 46 the SPC Circulars and the Securities Law remain silent on how
42

Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 19.
44
SANZHU ZHU, SECURITIES DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 186 (2007) (summarizing the
criticism from academics, practitioners, and judges on the cumbersome causation rule).
45
2005 Securities Law, supra note 15, art. 234.
46
Lüshi Fuwu Shoufei Guanli Banfa (律师服务收费管理办法) [Management Measures
of Fee Charging for Lawyers’ Services] (promulgated by the Ministry of Just., Apr. 13,
2006, effective Dec. 1, 2006) (Lawinfochina) (China). Article 12 expressly provides that
outcome-related fees are prohibited in criminal, administrative, state compensation, and class
43
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these lawsuits should be funded. In this light, the general rule is that each
side bears their own costs of retaining lawyers at the beginning of the
lawsuit.47 Should the action fail, plaintiff investors face the consequences
of being liable for not only their own costs, but also need to reimburse the
litigation expenses of the prevailing defendant, including filing fees and
other costs.48 Even if the action is successful, investors may not be able to
recover their lawyers’ fees from the losing party. This potential exposure
for a substantial amount of costs, coupled with the absence of litigation
funding in China, dissuades many shareholders from suing even when they
have a meritorious claim.
Substantial filing fees (anjian shoulifei) further erode plaintiffinvestors’ incentives to commence litigation. In China, filing fees are
calculated on a sliding scale based on the contested amount, with a
maximum percentage of 2.5% for amounts below RMB 10,000, and a
minimum of 0.5% for amounts above RMB 20 million.49 Although filing
fees are borne by the losing party, plaintiffs usually advance them when the
action is brought.50 Thus, plaintiffs are immediately presented with a high
expense if they seek recovery of any significant funds. The problem is
aggravated when a court decides to hold multiple trials for various similar
individual claims. This point is borne out in the landmark ST Dongfang
case.51 In that case, without offering any justification, the court required, as
a condition for accepting the case, that all sixty-one plaintiffs split into

action cases. Id. art. 12. Article 4 further provides that lawyers should charge service fees
using the government-directed prices (zhengfu zhidao jia) and the market-regulated prices
(shichang tiaojie jia). Id. art. 4.
47
See Chen Lihua Deng 23 Ming Touzi Ren Su Daqing Lianyi Gongsi, Shenyin
Zhengquan Gongsi Xujia Chenshu Qinquan Peichang Jiufen An (陈丽华等 23 名投资人诉
大庆联谊公司，申银证券公司虚假陈述侵权赔偿纠纷案) [Chen Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi
Co. & Shenyin Sec. Co. for False Misrepresentation], 2005 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 30
(Heilongjiang High People’s Ct. Dec. 21, 2004). In this case, the claimants sought to
recover all their attorneys’ fees from the losing defendant company. The court rejected the
claim, suggesting that it was “groundless in law.” Id.
48
While Chinese courts generally award trial costs to the winner, such costs are usually
defined as funds paid to the court as filing and other fees and do not include attorney’s fees.
49
Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用缴纳办法) [Measures of Charging Litigation
Fees] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 8, 2006, effective Apr. 1, 2007), art. 13
(Lawinfochina) (China).
50
Minshi Susong Fa (民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008), art. 107 (Lawinfochina)
(China) [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law].
51
See Li Xinyu (李欣玉), Zhengquan Minshi Susong Xin Wenti, Gongtong Susong
Yuangao Renshu Shouxian ( 证券民事 诉讼新 问题 共同 诉讼原告人数受限 ) [A New
Problem in Private Securities Litigation: The Number of Plaintiffs in Joint Actions Are
Limited], ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO ( 证 券 时 报 ) [SEC. TIMES] (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://rmrb.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030409/966783.html (China).
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groups of no more than ten.52 As a result, it would appear uneconomical to
pursue modest claims, and therefore most resource-poor investors are
deterred from seeking redress through litigation and gaining access to
justice.
A related criticism is that group litigation (jiti susong) rules in China
are underdeveloped, and restrictive group litigation rules apply in the
context of securities litigation. Article 12 of the 2003 Circular provides that
in cases of joint action (gongtong susong), the number of plaintiffs must be
determined prior to trial.53 Furthermore, plaintiffs must advance substantial
filing fees in full when the case is brought, and judgments bind only those
who have registered their rights to the court. As shareholders are
geographically dispersed across China, this arrangement is likely to require
significant upfront costs in order to aggregate a massive number of claims
and seek assent from all the plaintiffs opting into litigation.
This is to be contrasted with the more plaintiff-friendly representative
litigation (daibiaoren susong) rules under Article 55 of the Civil Procedure
Law, which allow cases to be brought by an undefined number of
litigants.54 The courts are empowered to organize affected individuals into
a class by issuing a public notice instructing persons entitled to participate
in the action to register with the people’s court and opt into litigation within
a specific period of time.55 Additionally, plaintiffs in Article 55 actions are
relieved from paying filing fees upfront.56 Similar to the class actions suits
in the United States, the results of the Article 55 litigation will be binding
on those who have registered their rights with the court and also those
unregistered members who are not time barred from the lawsuit.
Unfortunately, fearful that listed companies could become a target of
rising public anger over endemic market frauds, and due to the
apprehension over opening the floodgates to many complex securities
cases, 57 the SPC effectively denies potential plaintiffs from utilizing the
more robust representative litigation rules under Article 55 for bringing

52

Id.
2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 12.
54
Civil Procedure Law, supra note 50, art. 55.
55
Id.
56
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi
Susong Fa Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (最高人民法院关于使用中华人民共和国民事诉讼法
若干问题的意见) [Matters Concerning the Institution of Class Actions Provided for Under
the Civil Procedure Law and the Opinion on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation of
Civil Procedure Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., July 14, 1992,
effective July 14, 1992), art. 129 (China) (determining that the filing fees will be borne by
the losing party after the case is concluded).
57
Bei Hu, China Urged to Adopt Class Action Suits, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 21,
2002, 12:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/article/398254/china-urged-adopt-class-action-suits.
53
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civil compensation claims. 58 This deprives investors from the benefits of
the economies of scale in litigation that are otherwise available under the
existing legal framework, and reduces the effectiveness of private securities
litigation in China.
3. Lack of Judicial Infrastructure
Despite recent reforms to strengthen their competence,59 concerns have
frequently been voiced about institutional deficiencies of the judiciary. The
courts’ difficulties stem from the tradition that judges have been selected
from non-legal careers and have received little to no formal education, let
alone legal training, prior to assignment to the bench. Coupled with
China’s short history of securities regulation—a technical, specialized area
of the law—it is hardly surprising that judges lack competence to correctly
adjudicate securities fraud cases. The technicality and complexity of
matters is particularly true in securities cases, where, by engaging in
speculative short-term transactions in the marketplace, retail investors may
be both the victims of securities fraud as well as contributors to the
commission of market misconduct. Not only will judges find it difficult to
distinguish violations of the Securities Law from non-violations, they may
also encounter difficulties in applying legal principles and assigning
culpability across defendants consistently.60
4. Summary: The Need for Reform
China has dedicated great efforts to upgrade its securities regulatory
regime and to further investor protection in recent years, but the overall
situation is still far from satisfactory. The SPC Circulars failed to provide
defrauded shareholders with a cost-effective procedure through which they
can gain access to the courts. The absence of economic incentives and the
high upfront costs in bringing securities fraud suits deterred most retail
investors from achieving recourse through civil litigation. Indeed, few
would dare invest upfront in the high filing fee and other expenses in
exchange for the negligible compensation that might possibly result.
According to a recent study by Liebman and Milhaupt, only about

58
2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 12; see also Civil Procedure Law, supra note 50, art.
55 (addressing the difficulties of retail securities litigation by using representative rules).
59
For instance, since 2002, all new judges in China are required to possess bachelor’s
degrees. The SPC further stated that sitting judges under the age of forty are required to
obtain a degree within five years or will lose their jobs. Judges who are above the age of
forty and lack university education are permitted to stay on if they have completed a training
course. See Benjamin Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform 2007 CHINA Q. 620, 625
(2007).
60
See Layton, supra note 7, at 1967 (arguing that the current legal and political
environment does not support a greater role for private securities litigation).
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fifteen percent of suit-eligible companies have in fact been sued since the
promulgation of the SPC Circulars.61 While fifteen percent may seem high
at first glance, it must be noted that these companies have already been
sanctioned by the CSRC or other administrative authorities for
misrepresentation in their disclosure documents. 62 Because the factual
finding of wrongdoing has already been made, these suit-eligible companies
would appear to be easy targets for securities suits. Yet, over eighty percent
of these eligible companies have not been sued in practice. 63 Furthermore,
only a handful of cases have resulted in the imposition of liability on the
defendant, while a small number of cases have been settled after court
mediation. 64 According to Yixin Song, a prominent securities lawyer in
China, about 10,000 investors, or ten percent of the shareholders who are
eligible to sue, had initiated securities-related lawsuits by the end of July
2006, but only about 1,000 of them have obtained some form of redress.65
The amount of claimed damages represents less than five percent of the
total losses incurred by public investors as a result of securities fraud.66
Even if regulators have punished some of the most outrageous manipulators
in the securities market, lax enforcement of the law has led to extensive
misappropriation and securities fraud on the market, 67 because the risk of
being caught and penalized is slim enough to be negligible, whereas the
potential gain from fraudulent activities can be very lucrative. Companies
and other wrongdoers are not sufficiently punished for their fraud, which
affects public confidence in the market.
III. EMPOWERING SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS: THE CLASS

61
Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s
Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 943 (2008).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies:
Lessons from China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 184, 193 (2005).
65
Song Yixin (宋一欣), Jiakuai Tuijin Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Fazhi Jianshe (加
快 推 进 证 券 民 事 赔 偿 法 制 建 设 ) [Accelerate the Development of Securities Civil
Compensation System in China], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO (中国证券报) [CHINA SEC.
DAILY]
(July
27,
2006,
5:35
AM),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20060727/0535821672.shtml (China).
66
Shentu Qingnan & Chang Qing (申屠青南 常庆), Kelong An Lüshi Weiquan Tuan
Jianyi: Jinkuai Sheli Touzi Zhe Baohu Xiehui (科龙案律师维权团建议：尽快设立投资者
保 护 协 会 ) [Suggestion from the Lawyers for the Kelong Case: Set Up the Investor
Protection Committee As Soon As Possible], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO (中国证券报)
[CHINA
SEC.
DAILY]
(July
24,
2006,
9:49
AM),
available
at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/stock/2006-07/24/content_4871138.htm (China).
67
Zhong Zhang, Legal Deterrence: the Foundation of Corporate Governance—
Evidence from China, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 741, 760 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017406.
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ACTION SOLUTION?
The prevalence of securities fraud on the market and the importance of
investor protection have led scholars to consider alternative mechanisms for
regulatory enforcement. 68 Under U.S. federal law, persons with similar
causes of action and standing are allowed to pool their claims and resources
to bring one single action after obtaining certification from the court.
Therefore, class actions are seen as a useful procedure within economies of
scale to overcome the collective action problem in bringing claims that will
affect the interests of a group.69
One major feature of the American securities class action system is the
opt-out provision: persons holding claims concerning questions raised in the
class proceeding are bound by any resulting judgments, unless they
affirmatively elect to be excluded.70 However, the most beneficial aspect of
the class action mechanism for potential plaintiffs is that it can overcome
cost-related hurdles in bringing an action. While each individual’s loss is
insufficient to make the undertaking of individual litigation financially
viable, the aggregate claims of the plaintiff class may be substantial enough
to justify the potential costs. To facilitate access to the courts, various feeshifting mechanisms, such as the contingency fee arrangement, are in place
to relieve class members from the financial burden of launching these suits.
Contrary to the usual costs rule, where each litigant pays his own legal bill,
attorneys under the contingency fee arrangement charge nothing if a case is
lost. If the case is settled or successful, attorneys are paid on a percentage
of damages recovered, which usually ranges between twenty-five and thirty
percent in the United States. Since class members are generally not liable

68
See, e.g., Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Jian-lin Chen, Reforming China’s Securities
Civil Actions: Lessons from PSLRA Reform in the U.S. and Government-Sanctioned NonProfit Organization in Taiwan, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 115, 117 (2008).
69
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). Eligible cases under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure must meet four threshold requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). In addition, Rule 23(b) provides that a
class action may be maintained if one of the three conditions contained therein is satisfied.
The first category of action under Rule 23(b) is implicated where the pursuance of separate
actions by or against individual class members would either establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or practically impair the interests of class
members who are not parties to the adjudication. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). The second
category of action is implicated where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that the final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(2). The third category of action is the common question action. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3). In practice, this requirement is met when “the court finds that questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for” the fair and
efficient adjudication of the dispute in question. Id.
70
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).
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for the costs of unsuccessful suits, the contingency fee arrangement
provides financial incentives for defrauded investors to pursue securities
claims that otherwise would not be brought at all. With the contingency fee
arrangement, the class action system could enhance access to justice and
provide retail investors with an economic means to obtain redress for
corporate misconduct in China.
Apart from economic considerations, class actions also help redress
the imbalance between the wrongdoers of fraud and minority public
shareholders. 71 In the Chinese context, the former are usually connected
with powerful local interests, while minority public shareholders have no
organized investor groups with comparable capacity. The class action
system can thus help these shareholders overcome fears of retaliation from
the wrongdoers and assist them in obtaining a remedy should an action be
brought by any member of the class on behalf of all members. Seen in this
light, private securities litigation has much potential as a useful deterrent
and remedial device in policing corporate insiders. A growing number of
jurisdictions 72 have actively considered adopting American class action
procedures to promote private enforcement. 73 In the wake of a series of
securities fraud scandals at the turn of this century, some Chinese scholars
have also called for the adoption of a U.S.-style class action system to
improve shareholders’ access to justice.74
Nonetheless, the fundamental flaw of the class action system is that
unnecessary and frivolous lawsuits may be encouraged for the sole purpose
of coercing settlements that are disproportionate to the merits of the
plaintiffs’ claims. 75 With the opt-out rule, plaintiffs can commence
proceedings on behalf of persons with no individual interest in the litigation,
or on behalf of persons unaware of the existence of the class action. The
71

2 HERBERT B NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 478 (4th ed.
2002).
72
Lisa Rickard, The Class Action Debate in Europe: Lessons from the U.S. Experience,
EUR. BUS. REV., http://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/?p=273 (last visited Jan. 15,
2013). For example, the European Union, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, and the
United Kingdom.
73
See id. (pointing out, however, the potential for abuses and economic burdens of
importing the U.S. class action system).
74
See, e.g., Pan Jianfeng & Chen Fuyong (潘剑锋&陈福勇), Lun Zhengquan Minshi
Qinquan Peichang Anjian de Susong Fangshi (论证券民事侵权赔偿案件的诉讼方式) [On
the Action Form of Civil Torts Compensation Cases Concerning Negotiable Securities], 22
ZHENGFA LUNTAN (政法论坛) [POL. SCI. & L. TRIB.] 77 (2004) (China); Tang Weijian &
Chen Wei (汤维建&陈巍), Fengxi Celüe: Woguo Jituan Susong Zhidu de Yizhi Lujing Tanxi
( 缝隙 策 略 ：我 国 集 团诉讼制 度 的 移植 路 径探 析 ) [Strategy of Limited Application:
Transplanting Foreign Experience to Reform the Mass Litigation System in China], 1
ZHENGZHI YU FALÜ (政治与法律) [POL. SCI. & L.] 111 (2008) (China).
75
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubenfield, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and
Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1075–82 (1989).
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combined effect of the opt-out rule and the contingency fee arrangement,
hence, gives rise to a serious risk that attorneys may simply discover a
cause of action, find a plaintiff, and then boilerplate a class action suit.
Given the litigation costs and the disruptive impact on the company’s
operations, defendant corporations in the United States are often inclined to
settle low value claims early on, regardless of the underlying merits.76 One
possible consequence is that unmeritorious cases are allegedly brought and
pursued solely in the hope that the management will offer a handsome
settlement to rid itself of the nuisance. Such a risk of abusive litigation has
even deterred the legal profession in the United Kingdom from adopting a
similar system.77
It is said that even for meritorious litigation, class actions “produce
wealth transfers among shareholders that neither compensate nor deter.” 78
Class action suits divert corporate resources from focusing on their normal
activities. 79 Additionally, significant fee awards and settlement amounts
result in higher director and officer insurance premiums. These premiums,
together with increased operating costs and settlement sums, are ultimately
passed on to shareholders.80 Critics have, therefore, rightly pointed out that
securities class actions are pocket-shifting wealth transfers by shareholders
who own shares of the company at the time of settlement to plaintiff
shareholders of the securities suit that enrich entrepreneurial lawyers at the
expense of average shareholders.81
Opt-out class actions also present a serious conflict of interest between
class members and their attorneys. Because attorneys acting for the class
will both be paid and recoup significant out-of-pocket expenditures if the
litigation is successfully concluded, they often have a strong financial
76
DEBORAH R HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOODS FOR
PRIVATE G AIN 119–20 (2000).
77
The introduction of a class action system was initially proposed in the Finance Bill
2010, but the proposal was subsequently dropped in the rush for the May 2010 General
Election.
Class Actions: A Global Update, ALLEN & OVERY (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Class-Actions—A-Global-Update.aspx.
78
John Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006).
79
It was reported that “between 1999 and 2004, one major U.S. drug maker spent $25
billion [USD] on legal costs and reserves to fight class action lawsuits, while devoting only
$19 billion [USD] to research and development.” Rickard, supra note 72 (brackets in
original).
80
See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL
MARKETS
REGULATION
78
(2006),
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf.
81
See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487,
494–98 (2007); John Coffee, Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 229, 302–05 (2007).
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incentive to settle in the shortest amount of time possible, and may be
tempted to accept suboptimal or heavily discounted settlements at the
expense of class members whose interests they are appointed to guard.82
The risk of conflict is further exacerbated by the lack of protection the class
action procedure offers class members, who are typically given a small role
in the litigation. It is thus reported that securities class action suits recover
only a small percentage of the alleged investor loss. For instance, between
2004 and 2008, the median settlement to investor losses ratio ranged
between two and three percent, even though settlement payments have
dramatically increased over the years. 83 Plaintiff attorneys, however,
received massive fee awards that were disproportionate to the time and
effort expended in a case. In the landmark case Kamilewicz v. Bank of
Boston Corp., a settlement was reached in which each of the individual
class members was awarded USD 8.76, while class counsel received USD
8.5 million in fees.84
The above analysis reveals that, while the class action system and the
contingency fee arrangement can help police corporate management, they
are unlikely to substantially improve the prospects for a minority
shareholder. The problems that plague class actions in the United States
may vary in importance if applied in China. Should a securities class action
system be introduced in China, it may open the floodgates of frivolous or
unmeritorious litigation. It may also encourage unnecessary litigation in
China which, unlike some other legal cultures, is not a litigious society.
Additionally, securities suits may be heavily driven by lawyers with a view
to profit from lucrative fee awards, which may expose listed companies to
massive private securities fraud litigation on a scale that China can illafford, as a majority of the listed companies in China are SOEs or otherwise
controlled by the government. Successful cases, on the other hand, can
exert inexorable pressure on listed companies to succumb to large
settlement amounts. This may threaten current share prices and even force
the companies into dissolution in extreme cases, 85 which may in turn inhibit
the privatization reform process of SOEs that the securities market in China
82
See John Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs’ Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 701–04 (1986).
83
It is reported that “[t]he average settlement amount from 2002 and 2007 rose to USD
40.5 million, about two and a half times the average settlement amount of USD 16.3 million
from 1996 to 2001.” U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT AND THE PATH TO REFORM 9 (2008),
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1213.
84
92 F.3d 506, 508–09 (7th Cir. 1996).
85
See Richard M. Philips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs,
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1028–29 (1996).
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is designed to assist. 86 As the U.S. experience illustrates, these bountyhunter class actions may lead to over-enforcement, and hence, overdeterrence of securities fraud, which may dissuade foreign companies from
entering the country’s securities market.
In addition to the perceived risk of abuse, institutional differences
between the United States and China may operate as a key impediment to
the modeling of the U.S.-style class action regime in China. Unlike their
U.S. counterparts, a major hurdle confronting shareholders in China is
limited access to legal representation. The Chinese government has
maintained tight control over the participation of lawyers in joint or mass
actions for social stability reasons. In April 2006, the All China Lawyers’
Association, a government-backed regulatory body for lawyers in China,
promulgated a Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Mass Suits by Lawyers
(Guiding Opinion). 87 The Guiding Opinion stipulates that lawyers handling
mass suits (qunti anjian) are subject to supervision and guidance of the
judicial administration departments.88 A mass suit is defined as an action
where either side consists of ten or more individuals bound by common
questions of law or fact. 89 Lawyers are also required to report to the
responsible government agencies as soon as they discover any sign that
suggests potential intensification of the conflict, or any action on their
clients’ part that may threaten social stability.90 The absence of unrestricted
access to legal representation casts doubt as to whether the class action
system can dramatically enhance shareholders’ recourse to justice.
Moreover, the existing legal regime fails to offer a fixed solution to issues
such as stockholders’ standing to sue and the allocation of burden of proof,
making private securities litigation extremely difficult to handle.91
A related concern is that most of China’s local people’s courts lack
independence. 92 Although China’s Constitutional Law recognizes the
86

“The goals of SOE reform are not simply to enhance corporate productivity and
financial performance, but to create an optimal institutional arrangement compatible with the
reform of a market-oriented economy.” WORKING GRP. ON PRIVATISATION & CORP.
GOVERNANCE OF STATE OWNED ASSETS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., STATE
OWNED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA: REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE
3
(2009),
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceofstateownedenterprises/42095493.pdf.
87
Zhonghua Ouanguo Lüshi Xiehui Guanyu Lüshi Banli Quntixing Anjian de Zhidao
Yijian (中华全国律师协会关于律师办理群体性案件的指导意见) [Guiding Opinion on
the Handling of Mass Suits by Lawyers] (promulgated by All China Law. Ass’n, Mar. 20,
2006, effective Mar. 20, 2006) (China).
88
Id. art. 1(3).
89
Id. art. 1(1).
90
Id. art. 2.
91
1 DANIEL FUNG ET AL., ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE ¶ 24-08, at 702
(2004).
92
Chinese local courts are funded and subsidized by the relevant local people’s
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independence of the courts as a whole,93 local governments control local
courts through their control of the budget and their power to appoint,
promote, and remove judges. 94 This is especially problematic in light of
China’s current issues with widespread protectionism and corruption. 95
Local courts may not be able to fend off local political party and
governmental pressures, potentially violating due process and independent
judicial decision-making. The risk of undue interference is particularly
imminent if the interest of the government or SOE in that locality is at issue
in a case pending before the court. Not only are courts hesitant to allow
claims against important local companies or persons, claims are also subject
to extensive oversight by the judicial committee (shenpan weiyuanhui),
which essentially decides how important or politically sensitive cases
should be decided. 96 As judges rarely resist the committee’s determination
or recommendation, the independent decision-making process is
undermined. Besides, the performance of judges is evaluated based on the
number of cases they process. 97 Since a class action is likely to
disadvantage the court’s caseload, judicial hostility towards class actions
may intensify should they be implemented in China.98
During its transition from a planned to a market economy, and in the
process of developing the rule of law, better shareholder protection through
the provision of the private securities class action mechanism is unlikely to
be feasible in China’s current political-legal landscape. The reluctance to
permit private securities litigation, particularly those based on class actions
involving a large number of plaintiffs, reflects a broader concern relating to
social stability. Class actions carry significant political overtones, because
they are likely to involve politically well-connected local entities or
persons. More fundamentally, class actions carry significant political
overtones in the Chinese securities context. Class actions provide the
means through which a group of aggrieved shareholders are organized into
government. See ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 200–04 (4th ed. 2011).
93
XIANFA art. 126 (1982) (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi
Fa (中华人民共和国人民法院组织法) [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s
Republic of China] art. 4 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5,
1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980) (Lawinfochina) (China).
94
XIANFA art. 127 (1982) (China) (stating that while the SPC supervises the adjudicative
work of all lower level people’s courts, it has no power over their budgets).
95
Gu Weixia, Judicial Review over Arbitration in China: Assessing the Extent of the
Latest Pro-Arbitration Move by the Supreme People’s Court in the People’s Republic of
China, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 221, 258–59 (2009) (“[L]ocal protectionism must be prevalent
unless the court can relieve itself from the budget constraints.”).
96
See CHEN, supra note 92, at 186.
97
Benjamin Liebman, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1533
(1998).
98
Id.
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a class, which has the potential to destabilize society and, understandably,
trigger anxiety in the government. Some local judges have even publically
expressed that mass actions are politically too risky, 99 and that political
stability is preferred to other market values.100 In this light, Chinese courts
have historically been inhospitable to investors seeking compensation for
losses resulting from securities fraud, and it is unlikely they will be more
hospitable in the near future.
IV. SECURITIES ARBITRATION: AN ALTERNATIVE OUT
Having concluded that modeling the U.S. class action system in China
is quite unlikely to supply the optimal level of private enforcement to police
corporate misconduct and deter securities fraud in China, this Part explores
how to reform the present system of securities fraud litigation in a way that
balances the competing interests of state control, social stability, and
minority shareholder protection. In view of the dominance of retail
shareholders in the Chinese securities market, a cost-effective and
accessible alternative dispute resolution mechanism may be more feasible
in addressing the deficiencies of privately enforcing securities regulation.
This Part focuses on one of the more promising mechanisms in this area:
securities arbitration.
A. The Rise of ADR in the Settlement of Financial Disputes
During the last few years, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
such as mediation and arbitration have been gaining popularity in settling
financial disputes. In essence, mediation is a voluntary dispute resolution
process in which an independent neutral person, the mediator, helps the
parties resolve their disputes and reach a negotiated settlement. 101
Arbitration, on the other hand, is more akin to litigation than mediation. It
is a private means of resolving disputes through the use of neutral third
party arbitrators, who are usually appointed by the disputing parties’
agreement. Compared to litigation, arbitration is less formal, emphasizing
equity and efficiency above strict observance of legal norms.102
The speed and cost savings associated with ADR offer much appeal in
the settlement of financial disputes. Arbitration is cheaper and speedier
than litigation because, rather than having generalist judges who must rely
upon the assistance of experts— possibly prolonging the hearing and
99

Hutchens, supra note 16, at 645.
Nicholas C. Howson, Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai
Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW
PROMOTION 134, 147 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2009).
101
JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL 62
(2d ed. 2001).
102
Id. at 138.
100
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increasing costs— arbitration allows parties to appoint experts
knowledgeable about industry customs to serve as arbitrators. Recent years
have, therefore, seen an increasing worldwide interest in ADR mechanisms
to resolve financial and securities disputes. For instance, in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the enforceability of pre-arbitration agreements to settle disputes between
broker-dealers and their customers. 103 In addition, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) offers U.S. investors the option to resolve
disputes via mediation or arbitration, the latter of which is more popular.
Throughout 2012, a total of 4,299 arbitration cases were filed through the
FINRA process, parties agreed to mediation in 572 cases, and 776 cases
were closed through mediation. 104 In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority appointed the Hong Kong International Arbitration
Center (HKIAC) to administer the Lehman Brothers-Related Investment
Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme to resolve minibonds
claims between banks and investors arising from the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in 2008.105 In a similar vein, the Financial Ombudsman Service
(FOS) was established in the United Kingdom to resolve consumer
financial disputes. 106 The FOS provides free and independent advice to
consumers on resolving disputes with financial companies. According to
figures revealed by TheCityUK, an independent body established to
promote the financial and related professional services industries in the
United Kingdom, the total number of disputes that have been resolved
through arbitration and mediation reached a total of 34,541 in 2009, up
seventy-eight percent from 19,384 disputes resolved in 2007.107
Mediation and arbitration are also popular dispute settlement
alternatives in China. Indeed, as early as 1994, Chinese law has recognized
arbitration as a legitimate choice for the resolution of intra-corporate
conflicts in the context of Chinese corporations listed abroad. Article 163
of the Notice on the Implementation of the “Mandatory Provisions of
Articles of Association of Companies Seeking Overseas Listing” (Guanyu
103

490 U.S. 477 (1989).
Dispute
Resolution
Statistics,
FIN.
INDUSTRY
REG.
AUTHORITY,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/ (last updated Dec.
18, 2012). In 2010, 5,680 cases were filed through the FINRA arbitration process, parties
agreed to mediation in 823 cases, and 497 cases were closed through mediation. Id. In
2011, 4,729 new arbitration cases were filed, parties agreed to mediation in 659 cases, and
783 cases were closed through mediation. Id.
105
Gu Weixia, ADR and Financial Disputes in Hong Kong: The Lehman Brothers
Experience and the Way Forward, ASIAN DISP. REV., Jan. 2011, at 20, 20.
106
See FIN. OMBUDSMAN SERV., http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/ (last updated
Mar. 12, 2012).
107
THECITYUK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN LONDON AND THE UK 2010, at 1 (2011),
available at http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/dispute-resolution-inlondon-and-the-uk-2010/.
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Zhixing Dao Jingwai Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Bibei Tiaokuan de
Tongzhi) provides for a compulsory arbitration clause whereby disputes
between a Chinese corporation listed in Hong Kong and its shareholders
must be arbitrated under the HKIAC or the China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). 108 In addition, the SPC
Circulars provide legislative support for the use of ADR methods in settling
civil compensation claims arising from misrepresentations in the disclosure
documents of listed corporations. Article 4 of the 2003 Circular instructs
the people’s courts to stress (zhaozhong) mediation while adjudicating cases
and to encourage settlement of private securities fraud disputes. 109 Seen in
this light, ADR could play an important role in handling the large number
of securities-related fraud disputes in China. The people’s courts have
limited resources, but ADR could help ensure timely and efficient
proceedings.
B. The Way Forward: Securities Arbitration Scheme
At present, the courts are the only dispute resolution mechanism for
aggrieved shareholders in China to recover financial losses from the
wrongdoers of securities fraud. Drawing upon the global ADR trend, and
bearing in mind the need to improve shareholders’ access to justice,
defrauded shareholders who have suffered financial losses resulting from
securities fraud should be provided with an additional avenue to resolve
civil compensation claims in a cost-effective and expeditious manner.
Unduly legalistic procedures should be avoided to keep resolution simple
for average retail shareholders.
In view of the institutional experience in the United States and Hong
Kong, a securities arbitration scheme should be introduced in China for the
resolution of civil compensation claims that fall within the scope of the
Securities Law. Even though securities arbitration has not achieved full
legal efficacy in China, the securities industry has widely agreed for some
time now that a dispute resolution scheme combining low cost and high
efficiency is necessary.

108
Guanyu Zhixing Dao Jingwai Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Bibei Tiaokuan de
Tongzhi ( 关 于 执 行 《 到 境 外 上 市 公 司 章 程 必 备 条 款 》 的 通 知 ) [Notice on the
Implementation of the “Mandatory Provisions of Articles of Association of Companies
Seeking Overseas Listing”] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, Aug. 27, 1994),
art.
163
(China),
available
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ssb/ssflfg/bmgzjwj/ssgszl/200911/t20091110_167714.ht
m.
109
2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 4. The 2003 Circular instructs courts to use
mediation as a method of resolving cases concerning misrepresentation in accordance with
principles and procedures of mediation set out in the Civil Procedure Law. Id.; Civil
Procedure Law, supra note 50, at ch. 8 (providing mediation principles and procedures).
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1. Theoretical Merits of Securities Arbitration
While arbitration procedures bear many resemblances with court
proceedings, arbitration is superior to litigation in resolving securities
disputes in three aspects. First, an arbitrator is more familiar with the
securities regulatory regime and the commercial realities involved in each
case. Unlike litigation, where there is a need to explain technical matters to
generalist judges, the use of experts in arbitration allows for speedy
resolution of disputes. Hence, arbitration satisfies the securities market’s
need for an industry-specific type of dispute resolution. 110 Second, parties
to arbitration can tailor procedures to fit the circumstances of a particular
case. Accordingly, relevant issues can be identified more quickly and
accurately to avoid unnecessary delay and expenses. Third, arbitral
hearings are carried out in private, and the awards are only published in an
anonymous manner.111 Further, arbitration ethical rules require arbitrators
to maintain all information revealed during a case in strict confidence. 112
Hence, arbitration is particularly appealing for preserving business
confidence. This is especially vital for securities disputes, as the securities
market is sensitive, volatile, and responsive to such news.
More importantly, arbitration is well-suited to resolving civil
compensation claims arising from securities fraud in China, and thus
complements the weak enforcement of the Securities Law. Because legal
development lagged behind economic development in China, dispute
resolution based on principles of equity and fairness of arbitration in the
securities context offers much flexibility to deal with scenarios where there
are gaps between the law in the text and law in reality (de jure and de facto)
in China. The use of arbitration also saves scarce Chinese judicial
resources by relieving local courts from the need to hear a large number of
civil compensation cases when a scandal breaks out, and thus enhances
judicial efficiency. 113 Moreover, the speed and cost savings associated with
110
This is particularly true in China, because judges are generally less experienced in
dealing with commercial disputes. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
111
Zhonguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Zhongcai Guize (2012 Ban) (中国
国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规则 (2012 版) [China International Economic & Trade
Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2012 Edition)] (promulgated by China Council
for the Promotion of Int’l Trade & China Chamber of Int’l Com., Feb. 3, 2012, effective
May 1, 2012), art. 36 (China), available at http://cn.cietac.org/Rules/index.asp (providing
that an arbitral tribunal may not hear cases in an open session) [hereinafter 2012 CIETAC
Rules].
112
Zhongcaiyuan Shouze (仲裁员守则) [Arbitrators Code] (promulgated by China Intl
Econ. & Trade Arb. Comm’n, Apr. 6, 1993, amended May 6, 1994), art. 13 (China).
113
For instance, in the past decade, several highly sensational cases involving listed
corporations have occurred, such as Shenzhen Kondarl (Grp.) Co. in 2000, and New
NongKai Global Invs. Ltd. and Xin Jiang Hops Co. in 2003. Numerous lawsuits have been
filed against these listed corporations, which have been involved in corporate malpractice.
Unfortunately, the process of settling these lawsuits is often blocked by procedural issues.
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arbitration offer a practical and economic alternative for most resource-poor
Chinese retail investors to police corporate behavior. Economic analysis of
law has occupied an outstanding position in securities research. When
determining the pros and cons of a particular dispute resolution mechanism
related to securities in China, arbitration is expected to prosper because it
can offer the most synergies in terms of efficiency and cost saving.
Securities arbitration therefore has the potential to improve shareholders’
access to justice in China. 114
Stability of the securities market is a particularly important goal in
China, because the securities market is still in its infant stage. Arbitration
may help China realize this goal. As mentioned before, arbitration keeps
disputes confidential, preventing sensitive information from becoming
widespread. Through the confidential and stable process of arbitration,
greater stability in the securities market may be achieved at minimal cost
and maximum efficiency. Therefore, arbitration may serve to both protect
the interests of minority shareholders and maintain social order in the
securities market.115 In this sense, securities arbitration has the potential to
enhance social stability. 116
2. Institutional Setup of the Securities Arbitration Scheme
Creating a new entity at the national level to oversee the securities
arbitration scheme would be a costly and time-consuming option. For this
purpose, it would be most cost effective for future civil compensation
claims to be woven into one of the pre-existing arbitration resources in
China. This Article suggests that China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission is the most appropriate forum for the following
reasons.
CIETAC is the most experienced forum for commercial arbitration in
China, and handles the majority of such disputes at a price that general
market players can afford. 117 CIETAC was founded in 1956 under the
auspices of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
(CCPIT) to aid the CCPIT in promoting international trade by providing an
impartial forum for resolving foreign-related disputes. Since then, it has
transformed from a quasi-judicial dispute resolution body to a truly modern

before the substantive issues are treated and damages are paid. See 1 FUNG ET AL., supra
note 91, ¶ 24-04, at 700–01.
114
Id. ¶ 24-20.
115
Id. ¶ 24-25.
116
Confidentiality is another aspect of arbitration that China may desire because China
often does not favor public exposure of its companies.
117
LIJUN CAO, THE FOUND. FOR LAW, JUSTICE & SOC’Y, CIETAC AS A FORUM FOR
RESOLVING
BUSINESS
DISPUTES
1–2
(2008),
http://www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/publications/FLJ%2BS%20Cao%20pb_c.pdf.
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international commercial arbitration institution. Currently, it is the largest
and busiest arbitration institution in the world in terms of annual
caseload. 118 It is also the leading arbitration commission in China,
administering a wide array of domestic and foreign-related disputes,
including disputes that involve international trade and investment, financial
leasing, and service contracts. 119
CIETAC’s popularity in the international arbitration community can
partly be explained by its commitment to bring its arbitration procedures in
line with international practice and standards. The CIETAC Rules have
been revised seven times since its inception, and its 2005 amendments
(2005 CIETAC Rules) addressed some of the most common criticisms of
CIETAC procedures.120 Most noticeably, for the first time, a procedure was
introduced for the selection and appointment of arbitrators not listed in the
CIETAC Arbitrator Panel (zhongcaiyuan mingce). 121 Prior to the
introduction of this rule, CIETAC had adopted the panel system, where
only those CIETAC-Panel-listed arbitrators could be appointed. 122 This
widening of potential arbitrators will dramatically increase the pool of
experts and foreigners available to serve on a CIETAC tribunal and will
have a significant practical impact on increasing the parties’ procedural
autonomy.123 Although CIETAC must confirm such an appointment,124 in
the words of one scholar, “such confirmation is more of a formality and the
appointment of foreign arbitrators is most unlikely to be objected without a
good reason.” 125 This reform was coupled with measures to strengthen
arbitrator impartiality. The 2005 CIETAC Rules provide that an appointed
arbitrator must declare any matters that may raise reasonable doubts about
his or her independence and impartiality and request withdrawal.126 This
should enhance the independence of the arbitrators. In May 2012, CIETAC
carried out further amendments to its arbitration rules (2012 CIETAC Rules)
118
GU WEIXIA, ARBITRATION IN CHINA: REGULATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND
PRACTICAL ISSUES ¶ 2.025 (2012).
119
Id.
120
See Gu Weixia, China’s Arbitration: Restricted Reform, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CHANGE AND CHALLENGES 271, 273 (Guanghua Yu ed., 2011).
121
Zhongguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Zhongcai Guize (2005 Nian
Xiuding) (中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规则 (2005 修订)) [China International
Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2005 Revision)] art. 21(2)
(promulgated by China Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade/China Chamber of Int’l
Commerce, Jan. 11, 2005, effective May 1, 2005) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter 2005
CIETAC Rules].
122
Gu Weixia, The China-Style Closed Panel System in Arbitral Tribunal Formation—
Analysis of Chinese Adaptation to Globalization, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 121, 146 (2008).
123
Id.
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2005 CIETAC Rules, supra note 121.
125
JINGZHOU T AO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 120–21 (2d ed. 2008).
126
2005 CIETAC Rules, supra note 121, art. 25.
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in accordance with developments in the Chinese market, in particular, to
reflect the international trend of enhancing flexibility of arbitral
proceedings.127 The 2012 CIETAC Rules, following the lead of the 2005
CIETAC Rules, put greater emphasis on arbitrator impartiality. For
example, Article 28 of the 2012 CIETAC Rules requires the CIETAC
Chairman, for the first time, to consider the nationalities of the parties when
appointing an arbitrator in the absence of the party agreement. 128
Aside from its emphasis on due process, CIETAC has maintained its
institutional independence to a large extent. Unlike many local arbitration
commissions—which are financially sponsored by the local treasuries and
hence reliant on the local government for survival and development 129—
CIETAC has retained its financial autonomy. The steady increase of the
arbitration caseload has generated impressive income from arbitration fees,
and as such, CIETAC is less prone to administrative interference. 130
From a functional point of view, CIETAC is best equipped to hear
securities disputes because it has accumulated experience in handling
securities and financial disputes over decades. As early as 1994, the State
Council Securities Commission, the predecessor of CSRC, had designated
CIETAC as the arbitral tribunal for disputes between securities firms or
between securities firms and stock exchanges. 131 At the time of this
designation, the Securities Law was still being drafted. The 1993 draft of
the Securities Law proposed that a securities arbitration commission be set
up within the China Securities Association, but this proposal was ultimately
removed from the 1994 draft of the Securities Law. 132 Both the 1998
Securities Law and 2005 Securities Law failed to mention this earlier
proposal to establish a specialized securities dispute arbitration tribunal. 133
On the other hand, the State has emphasized CIETAC as a forum for
resolving securities disputes.
As a national arbitration commission, CIETAC is headquartered in
Beijing, with three sub-commissions in Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Tianjin.134
127

2012 CIETAC Rules, supra note 111.
See id. art. 28.
129
Gu Weixia, supra note 120, at 274–76 (explaining the inherent institutional defects of
local arbitration commissions).
130
See generally CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMMISSION, http://www.cietac.org
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
131
See Guowuyuan Guanyu Zhiding Zhongguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui
Wei Zhengquan Zhengyi Zhongcai Jigou de Tongzhi (国务院关于指定中国国际经济贸易
仲裁委员会为证券争议仲裁机构的通知) [Notice of the SCSC on Designation of CIETAC
as Arbitration Organization for Securities Disputes] (promulgated by the Sec. Comm’n of
the St. Council, Aug. 26, 1994, effective Aug. 26, 1994) (China).
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It has also established twenty-one liaison offices in different regions and in
different business sectors to promote its arbitration practice. 135 Its broad
geographical presence and nationwide resources provide convenient hearing
venues through which civil compensation cases lodged by retail
shareholders may be resolved.
Seen from this perspective, inviting CIETAC to be the arbitration
institution can take advantage of its established dispute resolution
experience and existing nationwide arbitration networks. Moreover, it may
fully leverage the CIETAC panel’s financial and securities expertise as well
as existing resources, such as finance, manpower, information technology,
and premises.
3. The Arbitration Process
i. Eligibility Requirements
This Article proposes that at the initial stage of the arbitration scheme,
shareholders should only be permitted to bring “follow-up” actions seeking
compensation against a listed corporation and other relevant wrongdoers
after the CSRC or other competent administrative agencies decide that the
conduct in question constitutes a Securities Law violation. This proposal
draws from the success of the Lehman Brothers-Related Investment
Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme in Hong Kong, where
investigative powers remain with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(HKMA) and Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), while the HKIAC
is mainly responsible for adjudication. 136 Retaining the powers of the
CSRC to deal with regulatory breaches while introducing CIETAC to
exclusively award damages would avoid duplication of powers and, in
addition, would recognize the effective division of responsibility in
financial dispute resolution. 137 To parallel civil actions, a limitations period
should also be set so that a claim is ineligible for arbitration if two or more
years have elapsed from the date of the decision, similar to the provisions
under the SPC Circulars. 138 Once civil discovery mechanisms in China
improve, shareholders should be allowed to bring “stand-alone” actions,
entitling parties affected by Securities Law violations to take civil action for

Sub-Commission (in Shenzhen), and the CIETAC International Economic & Financial
Arbitration Center (in Tianjin). About Us: Introduction, CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB.
COMMISSION, http://www.cietac.org/index/aboutUs/47601fd516b2517f001.cms (last visited
Jan. 6, 2013).
135
Examples include grain, commerce, construction, finance, leather, and wool
transactions. Id.
136
Gu Weixia, supra note 105, at 20–23.
137
See id. at 22–23.
138
2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 5; 2002 Circular, supra note 34, art. 2.
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the recovery of damages suffered, regardless of the outcome of criminal or
administrative investigations.
Critics have attacked the requirement of a prior administrative sanction
or criminal judgment before the initiation of a civil compensation suit on
the grounds that this requirement deprives investors of their statutory right
to a private action. 139 This is because under Article 6 of the Civil Procedure
Law, courts are required to hear cases independently without interference
from administrative agencies. 140 Given that the securities market in China
was intended to serve the economic goals of the State, it is conceivable that
the prior decision requirement may create opportunities for alleged
wrongdoers to escape civil liability by influencing the administrative or
criminal investigation process through their connections (guanxi).141 This
would limit civil litigation rights and the availability of compensation to
defrauded investors who suffer economic losses. Moreover, according to
Zhu, changing government policies may prevail through administrative
agencies at the cost of public investors’ legal rights and interests. 142
These are indeed valid criticisms of the securities enforcement regime
in China. However, the prior decision requirement is justifiable as a
temporary feature of the securities arbitration system in view of the high
information costs to bring securities fraud litigation. The stock market in
China is heavily dominated by retail investors who lack the requisite skills
and means to detect securities fraud. Not only do they have limited access
to internal corporate documents, 143 but there is also an absence of an
elaborate discovery mechanism in China, which is likely to place potential
claimants in a disadvantaged position in attempting to ferret out the
information necessary to establish a claim. For instance, although the Civil
Procedure Law empowers litigant representatives to investigate, collect
evidence, and inspect the files of a case in question, the Supreme People’s
Court formulates the scope and procedure for inspection. 144 In addition,
139

See, e.g., Guiping Lu, Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud Law in China: A
Critique of the Supreme People’s Court 2003 Provisions Concerning Private Securities
Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 781, 797 (2003).
140
Civil Procedure Law, supra note 50, art. 6.
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Guiping Lu, supra note 140, at 795–98.
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SANZHU ZHU, supra note 44, at 204.
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For instance, Article 34 of the Company Law provides that shareholders are allowed
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of board meetings, and financial reports. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人
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(China). Shareholders are entitled access to the company’s accounting books upon
submitting a written request stating their motives, but the company has the discretion to
decline such a request if it finds the request as being pursuant to any improper purpose that
may damage the legitimate interest of the company. Id.
144
Civil Procedure Law, supra note 50, art. 61.

313

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:283 (2013)

parties have no duty to respond to the adverse party’s requests to produce
documents, depose witnesses, or even answer questions prior to trial.
Production of evidence may be compelled only when the people’s court
considers it necessary for adjudicating the case in question. 145 As defrauded
shareholders lack the means to obtain information about the fraud or
misconduct at issue, they can avert difficulties in gathering the necessary
information to prove their case if they can rely on evidence gathered during
the criminal or administrative investigations. Even in the United States,
where information costs are arguably lower, a 2003 study by Cox, Thomas,
and Kiku shows that enforcement actions by the U.S. Securities Exchange
Commission are usually the foundation for successful private securities
lawsuits.146
While the CSRC and other administrative authorities are subject to
conflicts of interest arising from the ownership structure of the listed
companies in China, the policy dynamics are complex. Having pursued
market-oriented reforms for more than twenty years, some Chinese leaders
may find private securities enforcement a useful tool to play upon local
protectionism. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the CSRC has taken a
more active role in recent years in improving corporate governance within
listed companies. In March 2007, the CSRC started a three-year campaign
to strengthen corporate governance within listed companies. 147 During the
campaign, listed companies looked into existing corporate governance
problems, including misappropriation of corporate funds, inadequate
internal controls, and irregular operations at meetings of directors,
shareholders, and supervisory boards. The listed companies then made
rectification measures. 148 It was reported that this campaign resolved many
governance problems and promoted a culture of corporate and shareholder
autonomy.149 The report also stated that the listed companies gained greater
awareness of standard operations and improved their governance levels
during the campaign. 150
ii. The Arbitration Procedure
CIETAC should devise a set of procedural rules in line with its 2012
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Arbitration Rules to administer claims arising out of the securities
arbitration scheme. 151 In order to commence an action, potential claimants
should submit an arbitration application together with filing fees. Upon
receipt of the claim and fees, CIETAC’s Secretariat decides whether the
case is eligible to proceed. In this regard, CIETAC’s Secretariat has the
discretion not to process cases that are clearly frivolous or vexatious.
Arbitration proceedings should commence only after the Secretariat has
decided that proper requirements have been complied with.
Once a case is accepted, either party may request CIETAC to
informally resolve the claim through mediation prior to the appointment of
an arbitral tribunal. If both parties agree to mediate, they will proceed to
select a mediator and attempt to reach an agreement. If the mediation
process is successful the parties will sign a settlement agreement, the terms
of which may be incorporated into and issued as an arbitral award. Where
the mediation process does not result in a settlement, arbitration
proceedings will resume. Regardless of the outcome of a mediation process,
however, nothing exchanged between the parties or the mediator may be
relied on by the parties in subsequent judicial or arbitration proceedings
unless the parties agree otherwise. Additionally, the claimant will be barred
from litigating the case further in court after arbitration.152
Where mediation is unsuccessful, the parties will proceed to select and
appoint arbitrators. Depending on the amount of damages claimed and the
parties’ wishes, a case may be heard by a mutually agreed-upon arbitrator
or a panel of three arbitrators; 153 the latter choice of an arbitration tribunal is
more common. To further inject public confidence into the securities
arbitration scheme, CIETAC should impose additional safeguards in the
arbitrator selection process beyond the requirements of the 2012 CIETAC
Rules. CIETAC should provide parties with information on each
arbitrator’s education, employment history, prior arbitration awards, and
other relevant background information during the arbitrator selection
process. The parties could use the information to strike arbitrators with
potential conflicts of interest with the witnesses, issues, or securities in the
case.154
As the Hong Kong Lehman Brothers-Related Investment Products
151
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Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme reveals, adopting a complaintsbased approach in dealing with a multitude of individual cases may result in
a slow dispute resolution process. 155 In this light, procedural rules should
be fine-tuned and group arbitration rules should be incorporated to
accommodate a number of claims involving similar questions of law or
fact.156 In these cases, the first part of the proceeding should deal with the
issue of the defendant’s liability, and the second part of the proceeding
should deal with the application of legal principles to individual cases, and
where appropriate, the assessment of damages to be paid to individual
members.
Finally, this Article proposes charging both securities arbitration
claimants and defendants a fee similar to the existing fee structure for
CIETAC arbitrations. The charge is intended to cover the arbitrator’s fees
as well as CIETAC’s administrative expenses. It is envisaged that the
enhanced private enforcement through arbitration will encourage more
corporate compliance in China. Greater shareholder protection can, in turn,
change China’s business culture and macroeconomics in the long run.
iii. Relationship with the Securities Regulators
Structurally, the securities arbitration scheme and the securities
regulators should be operationally independent so as to prevent any political
and administrative intervention. For this purpose, it is desirable that,
instead of being under the shelter of the political party or the central
government, the securities arbitration scheme operates exclusively on its
arbitration fees revenue.
The relevant securities regulators, such as the CSRC and China’s two
stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, should, however, maintain
strategic oversight of the securities arbitration scheme. In this light, these
regulatory authorities should be empowered in the rulemaking arena to
ensure that the enforcement initiatives under the arbitration scheme are
complementary to the goals of securities regulation. On the other hand, to
avoid duplicative efforts and the blurring of their respective roles, CIETAC
should not have any investigative or disciplinary powers, which are instead
within the exclusive purview of the securities regulators. CIETAC should
be charged solely with the responsibility of handling civil compensation
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claims arising from securities fraud, and as such, will not issue fines,
impose sanctions, or take disciplinary actions.
iv. Implementation of the Securities Arbitration Scheme
In the initial stage of the arbitration scheme, a pilot scheme should be
launched to test the effectiveness of arbitration in resolving civil securities
fraud disputes in China. This pilot scheme is suggested to last for three
years to inform the investing public and other parties concerned about
securities arbitration. After three years, a full evaluation of the pilot scheme
could then be made. If the scheme is successful, this Article suggests that
the Chinese legislature pass laws making securities arbitration available
nationwide on a continuous and permanent basis.
Since shareholder claimants will only opt for arbitration if they clearly
understand the process, it is vital that the pilot scheme be widely publicized
before its execution. Accordingly, this Article proposes a lead-in period of
six months before implementation of the pilot scheme to organize activities
and to promote the awareness and understanding of the service among
relevant regulatory authorities, the legal profession, and members of the
investing public. During this lead-in period, an industry-wide effort should
also be made to solicit comments from securities regulators, scholars, and
practitioners to make sure the pilot project is reflective of various interest
groups’ views. The input given during this lead-in period would later be
tested and used to improve the permanent and independent securities
arbitration mechanism ultimately adopted.
4. Concerns of Securities Arbitration
Notwithstanding the advantages of arbitration and the legislative
endorsement of this dispute resolution mechanism, a securities arbitration
scheme also raises a few concerns that warrant discussion.
i. CIETAC’s Arbitral Jurisdiction
Critics may point out that CIETAC’s jurisdiction is limited, and should
not be extended to securities claims. CIETAC can exercise jurisdiction
over a case if the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable and the parties
have entered into a valid arbitration agreement. Articles 2 and 3 of the
Arbitration Law provide that disputes over rights and interests in
property—other than marital, adoption, guardianship succession, and
administrative disputes—between citizens, legal persons, and other
organizations that are equal subjects may be arbitrated. 157 Article 3 of the
2012 CIETAC Rules stipulates that CIETAC may accept cases involving
international or foreign-related disputes—including disputes related to
157
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Hong Kong, Macao, and the Taiwan region—and any domestic disputes.158
Therefore, civil securities fraud claims seem to be arbitrable.
Arguably, arbitration in China should only take place if the parties
have previously entered into an arbitration agreement. Article 4 of the
Arbitration Law provides that an arbitration commission may not accept the
case if a party unilaterally applies for arbitration “in the absence of an
arbitration agreement.” 159 Article 16 of the Arbitration Law further
stipulates that an arbitration agreement must be provided in a contract or
any other written form of agreement, and the agreement must specify the
subject matter to be arbitrated and the arbitration commission to hear the
dispute.160
In 2004, the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council and the
CSRC jointly promulgated a circular on the arbitration of securities and
futures contractual disputes (Arbitration Circular). 161 The Arbitration
Circular is the Chinese government’s most important attempt to promote
securities arbitration with the aim of making full use of arbitration’s special
advantages such as expedition, flexibility, low cost, and closed hearings.
Sadly, the Arbitration Circular excludes disputes between listed companies
and public investors from the scope of securities arbitration. 162 As
explained by respected commentators, a major issue underlying this
exclusion is that public investors usually do not have prior arbitration
agreements with listed companies. 163
To deal with this issue, an arbitration provision should be incorporated
in the memorandum or articles of association of a listed corporation to the
effect that all its shareholders are entitled to elect arbitration before the
CIETAC as a means to resolve civil compensation claims against the
corporation. This arbitration provision could also cover securities fraud
claims against other entities and individuals such as fiduciaries, employees,
and professional advisers. The provision would also include technical
details, such as the method of selection and appointment of arbitrators,
forum choice, and governing laws. For this purpose, employment and
service contracts between the corporation and its employees, fiduciaries,
and professional advisers should reference such a duty to arbitrate.
158
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Corporations that have already been listed on the national stock exchanges
can incorporate these arbitration provisions into the corporations’
constitutional documents through an amendment. The listing rules can
require corporations not yet been listed to include this provision in their
constitutional documents before they can be listed.
The first issue with this approach is whether such a provision in the
memorandum or articles of association amounts to a written arbitration
agreement as compatible with Article 16 of the Arbitration Law. 164 While
arbitration agreements must be in writing, the Arbitration Law is unclear as
to what constitutes written form.165 The 2012 CIETAC Rules provide that
an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in tangible document
form such as a contract, letter, telegram, telex, facsimile, EDI, or email. 166
Importantly, a company’s constitutional documents have long been
regarded as contracts between the corporation and each of its shareholders,
and among the shareholders, inter se. They are deemed to contain
covenants binding the corporation and its shareholders while engaged in
corporate affairs.
As the arbitration provision forms part of the
corporation’s memorandum of association, the threshold requirement under
Article 16 is likely to be satisfied.
The second issue with the arbitration provision approach proposed
above concerns shareholders’ notice of such a provision. Effective
shareholder notice is critical; otherwise, shareholders could not be said to
have consented to and entered into an arbitration agreement. Information
related to the arbitration should be disclosed in the pre-dispute arbitration
agreement to offer investors an opportunity to make informed decisions.
One option is to reference the memorandum and fully incorporate the
arbitration provision into the stock certificates issued by a listed corporation.
However, many shareholders hold their shares through nominees and would
never see the stock certificates that discuss the provision. For these
shareholders, an alternative option would be for the corporation to divulge
the arbitration provision on the corporation’s website, within its annual
reports, CSRC filings, and other disclosure documents on a periodic basis.
Apart from that, all issuers could be required to attach their memorandum
of association to each annual report filed with the CSRC under a new listing
rules requirement instead of making reference to previous reports. This
should be required regardless of whether amendments have been made to
the memorandum in that financial year. To bring the arbitration provision
to the attention of minority shareholders, some authors argue that the
164
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disclosure clauses should make it clear that arbitration is final and binding
on all parties, and that parties who choose arbitration waive their right to
seek remedies in court. 167
ii. Deterrent Effect
While confidentiality of the arbitration process and award is an
advantage of arbitration, future investors and regulatory authorities may be
left in the dark as to the reasoning behind the decisions and the ranges of
compensation. A system of arbitrators deciding cases on the basis of facts
and circumstances available before them may also produce inconsistent
rulings and varying compensation rates. Arguably, this may harm investors
because these ad hoc rulings may limit transparency and introduce a high
level of unpredictability to the compensation process, which would in turn
minimize the deterrent effect of private securities resolutions.
To allay the concern of inconsistent rulings, this Article proposes that
a system be developed to categorize investors based on factors relevant to
common disputes. This could produce common standards of compensation
applicable to various shareholder groups, ensuring a degree of uniformity in
compensation awards. To deepen public understanding of securities
disputes and increase transparency in the dispute resolution process, the
regulatory authorities may consider publishing information regarding
securities fraud claims filed against wrongdoers as well as cases that have
been dealt with. However, given that agreements reached between parties
in mediation and arbitration proceedings are private and confidential, this
Article suggests publishing only case synopses on an anonymous basis.
Hopefully, sharing information in this manner will promote greater
deterrence of securities fraud.
Another concern relates to the deterrence of unmeritorious lawsuits
before arbitral tribunals. To prevent the pitfalls of U.S.-styled class actions,
this Article suggests providing the CIETAC’s Secretariat with the power to
decide whether a case is eligible to proceed. Staff working at the CIETAC
Secretariat should have discretion not to allow cases to proceed when they
are clearly frivolous or vexatious. This screening process could be an
important means of deterring unmeritorious claims that only benefit lawyers.
iii. Enforcement of the Arbitral Award
Another concern relates to the enforcement of arbitration agreements
and awards. Arbitration agreements and arbitral awards must undergo
review by local Chinese courts for enforcement, but during the transition
from a planned economy to a market economy and in the process of
developing the rule of law in China, lower-level courts have not become
167
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sufficiently equipped to keep up with the pro-arbitration reforms initiated
by the SPC. 168 The lack of judicial integrity and quality as well as the
unbalanced development among people’s courts at different localities may
contribute to divergent enforcement records in both court judgments and
arbitral awards.
Under the Chinese Arbitration Law, when a party fails to comply with
an arbitral award, the other party may seek enforcement by applying to the
intermediate people’s court in which the recalcitrant opponent is domiciled
or owns property.169 Enforcement may be refused or set aside in limited
circumstances, such as when enforcement is against social and public
interests or where there are procedural irregularities in the arbitration. 170
Importantly, since 1996, the SPC has stepped up its efforts to both
guard against local protectionism regarding arbitral award enforcement and
facilitate the execution of arbitration awards. For example, the SPC
adopted a series of “pre-reporting” mechanisms (yuxian baogao) in
handling foreign-related cases. 171 Under this “pre-reporting” mechanism,
an intermediate people’s court is required to report its decision to the higher
people’s court for approval when it decides to set aside a foreign-related
arbitral agreement and award. 172 If the higher people’s court decides to
uphold the decision, it must report its determination to the SPC.173 Hence,
the intermediate people’s court can only set aside a foreign-related award
after obtaining approval from the SPC.
This dual regime could invite arguments of unfair discrimination
against national investors in favor of foreign investors. Foreign investors
were given access to the Chinese securities market following China’s
accession to the World Trade Organization. Since 2002, foreign investors
have been allowed to invest in RMB-denominated shares of corporations
listed on the national stock exchanges under the Qualified Foreign
Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme.174 This, however, contrasts with the
168
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enforcement of a domestic award, where grounds for refusing enforcement
are very broad and could potentially lead to a complete review of a
decision’s merits. Furthermore, the fact that the standards for enforcing
domestic awards are stricter than standards for enforcing foreign-related
awards suggests that the domestic regime is tougher. To illustrate, in an
empirical study conducted by Peerenboom, among sixty-three domestic
awards handled by one court in a large city in Jiangsu Province, two awards
were rejected and thirty-five awards were listed as pending. 175 Hence, the
domestic regime seemingly needs careful judicial checks as well, at least no
less than the checks on its foreign-related counterpart.
To overcome potential under-enforcement of arbitral awards, China
should narrow the grounds for refusing to enforce arbitral awards under the
securities arbitration scheme. Appeals on award should be limited to
procedural review, which would align the Chinese procedure with
international standards. 176 A potentially large scope of review of an arbitral
award under the local regime will obliterate the finality of the arbitration
award and obstruct shareholder claimants’ access to judicial recourse by
further complicating the process for recovering damages. The substantive
review invites possibilities of political intervention in the enforcement
process. In the long run, the foreign system is conducive to the
development of the capital markets in China, although “pre-reporting” may
invite challenges to judicial resources.
V. CONCLUSION
Although China’s Securities Law fails to provide an effective private
cause of action for shareholders who suffer financial losses resulting from
securities fraud, the SPC purported to remedy the situation by issuing three
judicial circulars between 2001 and 2003. The SPC circulars initially raised
high expectations that they would provide the much-needed judicial
safeguards in China for minority shareholders. Despite these expectations,
however, restrictive procedural rules and the lack of economic incentives in
the initiation of securities fraud suits effectively deprived aggrieved
shareholders in China from access to courts and judicial remedies.
The fundamental issue at stake in this context is how to best promote
private enforcement while balancing the interests of the State. As the above
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analysis reveals, direct transplantation of the U.S.-style class action system
and contingency fee arrangements raises concerns related to abusive
litigation and market instability. In looking forward, this Article asserts that
a cost-effective and accessible arbitration mechanism should be established
to promote private enforcement efforts in China for the benefit of minority
shareholder protection. The arbitral procedures can and should be simple
and accessible for average retail shareholders.
With these principles in mind, and drawing upon institutional
experience from the United States and Hong Kong, this Article suggests
that a securities arbitration scheme should be introduced as an out-of-court
alternative for shareholders to bring securities fraud claims against the
corporation and individuals or entities connected to the corporation. The
absence of alternative methods in handling securities disputes contributes,
at least to a certain extent, to the weaknesses of China’s securities market.
By utilizing the institutional and rulemaking capacity of the CIETAC,
China’s premier arbitration commission, the arbitration scheme proposed in
this Article stands a better chance of success than the class action proposal.
Moreover, a securities arbitration scheme can supply an optimal amount of
private enforcement to deter securities fraud, redress defrauded
shareholders, and maintain social market order. Hence, it can achieve a
better model of retail shareholder protection in China’s sociopolitical and
socioeconomic conditions.
Understandably, institutional deficiencies in China’s judiciary may
invite doubts as to the effectiveness of the securities arbitration scheme. It
is argued that lower level courts in China are not sufficiently equipped, both
infrastructurally and professionally, to keep up with the pro-arbitration
reforms initiated by the SPC.177 While addressing the local protectionism
issue, the SPC’s “pre-reporting” mechanism may drain judicial resources
and lead to delays. In this respect, the future fine-tuning of the procedural
rules in view of the operational experience of the securities arbitration
scheme remains open. But just as every coin has two sides, the limitations
of the securities arbitration scheme should not undermine its underlying
benefits as a workable and more effective alternative for private
enforcement of securities regulation in China.
Strengthening private enforcement efforts will be critical for China to
improve its corporate governance landscape and to strengthen investor
confidence. In the long run, this improved investor confidence will bring
about the healthy development of China’s securities market and act as an
engine for economic growth.
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